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Ia the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of 
the Estate of GERALD DALLAS 
THOMAS, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7221 
REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The r~spondent's brief concedes the accuracy of the 
statement of facts set forth in the appellant's brief, but 
states certain "additions." It will be noted that most of the 
additions apply to the issue raised by paragraph VIII (a) 
of the complaint, relating to the particular method used in 
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2 
placing cars on the bin at the time of the accident and 
death of the deceased. The evidence with respect to this 
issue was disputed, and the appellant does not claim any 
error on the part of the trial court in submitting this issue 
to the jury. For this reason, some of the evidence with 
respect to this issue was not detailed in appellant's original 
brief, and it is unnecessarily set forth in respondent's brief. 
The several arguments and contentions of the appel-
lant are set forth in its original brief under topic headings 
numbered I to VII inclusive. The same topical order and 
numbering is followed in the present reply brief, and the 
counter-arguments of the respondent are discussed under 
the appropriate heading of the appellant's numbering rather 
than respondent's, since the respondent's numbering varies 
from that of appellant's. 
I. 
Appellant's original brief under Point I, consists of 
the contention that there is no evidence of any violation by 
the defendant of the Safety Appliance Act, and that the 
trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury. In 
this connection, it was pointed out that under the doctrine 
of Myers v. Reading Company, 331 U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, 
there could be no jury issue without substantial evidence 
tending to prove that Thomas operated the brake on the car 
he was riding, with due care, in the normal, ~atural and 
usual manner and that the brake failed to function when 
so operated. It further was argued that so far as the 
record in this case, there was no evidence of any application 
of the brake by Thomas, until after the cars were ·less than 
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fifty feet from the end of the bin and Thomas had passed 
the "danger" sign. Under no circumstances indicated by 
the evidence could the cars have been stopped or prevented 
from going over the end of the bin by operation of the hand 
brake at this point. 
Respondent does not dispute either the above state-
ment of the law as set forth in the Myers case, or the fact 
that there was no evidence of any application of the brake 
by Thomas until too late to stop the cars from passing over 
the end of the bin. Respondent does claim however that 
there was an "evidentiary basis" for a finding that the brake 
was defective on the car Thomas was riding. According to 
respondent this consisted of the following: (1) Thomas at 
all times appeared to be in the performance of his duties, 
(2) that there was some application of the brake in slowing 
the cars, (3) that the vigorous application of the brake 
while the cars were going four miles per hour made no 
noticeable difference in their speed. 
An examination of the record fails to reveal any basis 
for any such conclusions. To support the statement that 
Thomas at all times appeared to be in performance of his 
duties, respondent directs attention to the testimony that 
Thomas was standing in the "prescribed" place on the brake 
platform of the car on which he was riding and therefore 
was in proper postion to have used the brake. From this 
single fact and nothing more, respondent then leaps to the 
broad claim that "Thomas at all times appeared to be in 
the performance of his duties." Certainly, appellant does 
not dispute that Thomas was riding in the "prescribed'' 
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position on the brake platform as the cars were being taken 
down the bin track. Where else could he have ridden? But 
respondent omits to mention that Thomas had another all 
important duty to discharge at that particular time. That 
duty was to apply the brake so as to control the speed of 
the cars and bring them to a stop on the bin. Did Thomas 
discharge this duty? Respondent suggests no evidence tend-
ing to show compliance with this duty, and the affirmative 
testimony is all to the contrary. No witness saw Thomas at 
every instant during his 3,000 foot ride down the bin track, 
but the witnesses Dodds and Ross did see him at several 
different points. On each occasion that they did observe 
him, Thomas was making no application of the brake what-
soever. Not until after the cars were less than fifty feet 
from the end of the bin structure was any attempt made to 
apply the brake. How then can it seriously be claimed that 
the evidence supports the assertion that at all times Thomas 
appeared to be in the performance of his duties? 
Respondent next claims that there was testimony of 
''some application of the brake in slowing the cars." To 
support this, respondent points to the testimony of Con-
ductor Barnes to the effect that the cars appeared to be 
slowing as they approached the bin; that speed on the bin 
track is usually attained the first five or six hundred feet 
on the heavy grade of the track and that thereafter the 
grade is comparatively regular all the way out to the bin. 
From this testimony, respondent jumps to the inference that 
Thomas was making application of the brakes as he rode 
along the track. But in considering the testimony of Barnes, 
it should be borne in mind that he was approximately a 
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half a mile away from the moving cars when making his 
observations. At no time could Barnes see Thomas on the 
cars from that distance (R. 170), and Barnes' testimony 
concerning the speed of the cars was based according to 
his own statement on what he "imagined" or "guessed" 
(R. 169, 193-194). Even more significant are the physical 
facts pertaining to the grade of the 3,000 foot bin track, 
as indicated by Exhibit A. For the first 300 to 350 feet, the 
grade is 3.5%. Loaded cars would naturally gain consider-
able momentum and speed on this portion of the track. 
For the next 500 feet the grade is slightly less, varying from 
3.5% to 0.5)c. From that point on it slackens appreciably, 
and for the remaining distance of approximately 22:00 feet 
to the bin, the grade is practically level and at two different 
places is slightly adverse. Naturally, cars rolling down the 
bin track would gradually slow up as the grade slackened. 
How can it be said that this natural slowing of the cars on 
the slackening grade would indicate an application of the 
brake by Thomas? Regardless of any application of the 
brakes, the cars would gradually lose their momentum as 
they approached the bin. In addition to these physical facts, 
the evidence is clear that at every point on the bin track 
where the cars were observed, no application of the brake 
was made by Thomas, until after the cars had reached a 
point less than fifty feet from the end of the bin. Dodds 
observed the movement of the cars from point "D" on Ex-
hibit A just as they entered the bin track until they reached 
point "D-4" about 1800 feet from the bin. At no time 
during this period was Thomas seen to do anything with 
reference to the brakes. He was just riding along, holding 
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onto the brake wheel (R. 319). Ross observed Thomas on 
the cars at point "R-4" as the cars entered the trestle ap-
proach to the bin structure and again as the cars passed 
the "danger" sign. At neither point was Thomas making 
any application of the brakes (R. 293-295, 306). Not until 
after the cars had passed the "danger" sign, did Thomas 
apply the brake (R. 295, 307). In view of this evidence, 
for the respondent to say that "there was some application of 
the brakes in slowing the cars" is not only inconsistent with 
the affirmative facts of the record, but is contrary to the 
physical facts with respect to what would be the natural 
behavior of the cars on the gradual slackening grade of 
the bin track. 
Respondent also asserts "that the vigorous application 
of the brake while the cars were going four miles per hour 
made no noticeable difference in their speed." But no evi-
dence exists to support any such assertion. The one and only 
application of the brake that Thomas ever was seen to make 
was "after he passed" the "danger" sign (R. 295, 307), 
when the cars were less than fifty feet from the end of the 
bin. Just previously, Ross had observed Thomas at two 
other points. First, at point "R-4" just as the cars 
entered the approach to the bin, at which time the cars 
were traveling at an estimated speed of twelve to fifteen 
miles per hour (R. 292-293), but Thomas made no applica-
tion of the brake at this point (R. 293). The cars then 
momentarily passed from view. The second point at which 
Ross observed Thomas was as the cars reached the "danger" 
sign. At this second point the cars were moving at an 
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estimated speed of eight to twelve miles per hour (R. 296), 
but Thomas still was making no application of the brake 
(R. 295). Thereafter, and after the cars had passed the 
"danger" sign, Thomas glanced over his shoulder at the 
"danger" signal and then applied the brake (R. 295). Be-
tween the point where the cars came into Ross' view as they 
reached the "danger" sign and the point where Thomas first 
made an application of the brake-a space of only a few 
feet-the cars "seemed to stay" according to Ross, at the 
relative speed of eight to twelve miles per hour (R. 296). 
After the application of the brake when the cars were less 
than fifty feet from the end of the bin, Thomas appeared 
to step down from the brake platform to the coupling 
of the car (R. 296) or to jump_ off the car (R. 307). Ross 
then left the scene because of the high tension wires which 
might endanger him if the cars went over the end of the 
bin. He did not see the cars leave the end of the bin (R. 
296). 
It is obvious that the above circumstances afford no 
basis for an inference that application of the brake made no 
noticeable difference in the speed of the cars. No evidence 
other than the foregoing is indicated by the respondent 
to support his argument that there was "an evidentiary 
basis" to justify submission to the jury of the issue of a 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act. Respondent states 
on page 21 of his brief that "there is not one scintilla of 
evidence in this case that there was no application of the 
brake." More properly it should be said that there is not 
one scintilla of evidence in this case that there was any 
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application of the brake-until concededly it was too late. 
Since when does a defendant have to prove non-application 
of the brake in order to be exonerated from a charge of 
maintaining the brake in a defective condition? 
At page 31 of its original brief, the appellant points 
out the fallacy of presuming that Thomas made timely 
application of the brake in the normal manner, as part of 
any presumption of due care on his part. This would be 
tantamount to drawing an inference of negligence on the 
part of the defendant from a presumption of due care on the 
part of the deceased. Looney v. Metropolitan Railroad Co., 
200 U. S. 480, 488, 2·6 8. Ct. 303, is cited as authority. 
The respondent takes issue with this proposition and 
quotes at length from Worthington v. Elmer, 207 Fed. 
306, 308-309. No violation of the Safety Appliance Act was 
charged in that case. And application of the principles of 
the Myers case to a finding of a defective hand brake was 
not there involved. Moreover, the negligence charged in the 
Worthington case consisted of "kicking" two cars at an 
excessive speed at a time when the brakes on the cars were 
defective and insufficient to control their movement. There 
existed undisputed evidence that the cars were moved at 
an excessive speed, also that the brake mechanism on one 
of the cars contained a specific defect which prevented 
proper setting of the brake. On a motion by defendant for 
a directed verdict, it was contended however that the de-
fective brake was not a proximate cause of the accident 
because there was no direct evidence that the deceased 
was using the defective brake at the time of his injury and 
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death. But the court held that there was evidence that the 
deceased was standing next to the defective brake at the 
time of the accident and in position to use it, that it was 
part of his duty to be using it at the time of the accident, 
and that these facts together with the presumption that the 
deceased was performing his duties, were sufficient to 
justify submitting the issue of proximate cause to the jury. 
Clearly, the case falls far short of holding that a charge 
of maintaining a defective handbrake in violation of the 
Safety Appliance Act may be proved against a defendant 
by inferring it from the mere presumption of due care in 
the performance of duty on the part of the deceased. In 
fact, the case is not remotely connected with any such a 
proposition. The same is true of the other two cases cited 
by respondent, namely, Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. Wether-
ington, 16 So. (2d) 720 and Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin 
Union R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409. In both of these 
cases, the court stated the familiar proposition that in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, it might be presumed 
that the deceased was engaged in the performance of his 
duty and exercising due care for his own safety at the 
time of his death. But to the knowledge of appellant, no 
court ever has twisted this principle into a holding that 
violation of a statute on the part of the defendant might 
be inferred from a mere presumption of due care on the 
part of the deceased. 
·As a matter of fact, no presumption of due care on the 
part of the deceased possibly could be indulged in the case 
at bar. The affirmative evidence is all to the contrary. 
Thomas had been given specific instructions by Conductor 
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Barnes three or four days before as to the proper method 
of controlling cars "dropped" down the bin track for spot-
ting on the coal bin (R. 178, 191-192). Barnes had told 
Thomas to reduce the speed of the cars to around seven or 
eight miles per hour when he reached the curve marked 
"B-1" on Exhibit A, located about 1100 feet from the bin, 
also when he approached the bin to have the brakes squeezed 
down to three or four miles per hour (R. 191, 198). Instead 
of following these instructions, according to Barnes' own 
testimony, when Thomas reached point "T" on Exhibit A, 
some 600 feet past the curve marked "B-1", the cars were 
going eight to ten miles per hour (R. 176) and when Thomas 
approached the bin the cars were moving five or six miles 
per hour (R. 193). At both points indicated, the cars were 
moving faster than the speed specified in Barnes' previous 
instructions to Thomas. According to the testimony of 
both Dodds and Ross, the cars were moving at a substantial-
ly faster rate at these points than the speed estimated by 
Barnes. All witnesses agreed that the unusual and excessive 
speed of the cars down the track attracted their attention 
and made them apprehensive. Also, as heretofore pointed 
out, Thomas at no time during the entire journey down 
the track ever was seen to apply the brakes until after 
he had passed the "danger" sign and it then was too 
late to prevent the cars from going over the end of the bin. 
In the face of such testimony, how can a presumption of 
due care in favor of the deceased possibly be indulged? 
At the very least, the negligent conduct of the deceased 
would be an issue for the jury, not a presumption to be 
indulged for his benefit and to convict the defendant of a 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act. 
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II. 
Under Point II of its brief, the appellant contends that 
the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issues of: 
( 1) alleged absence of bumper timbers or bumper device 
at the end of the bin ; ( 2) alleged hazardous construction of 
the bin, and also the further issue of (3) whether either 
of these alleged conditions contributed to the accident re-
sulting in the death of the deceased. 
With reference to the first issue, i. e., alleged absence 
of bumper timbers or bumper device at the end of the bin, 
respondent's brief fails to call attention to one single item 
of evidence that would constitute a basis for this issue. The 
allegation of negligence is not that the bumper device was 
inadequate or insufficient, but rather that no bumper de-
vice existed (R. 5). The evidence introduced by both the 
plaintiff and the defendant directly contradicts this allega-
tion. This evidence is set forth in detail in appellant's 
original brief pp. 17-19; 32-36. Respondent's brief indicates 
no additional or conflicting testimony. 
With reference to the second issue, i. e., alleged haz-
ardous construction of the bin, respondent argues not that 
the construction of the bin, itself, was hazardous, as alleged 
in the complaint, but rather that the bumper device on the 
end of the bin was not sufficiently solid or secure. But even 
if it were assumed that the complaint contained such an 
allegation, which it does not, it is apparent that there is no 
merit to the respondent's argument. The only evidence 
respondent points to consists of the observation of Barnes 
from a position approximately one-half mile away, that 
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when the cars hit the bumper device at the end of the bin 
"it seemed that this incline broke away from under them, 
and they pitched off of the bin onto the ground." From this 
single shred of testimony, respondent deduces that the jury 
should have been allowed to decide that the bumper device 
was not raised high enough above the rails, that it was not 
supported as solidly as the balance of the rails on the bin, 
and that some different but unspecified type of bumper 
device should have been used. It is, to say the least, doubt-
ful under the facts disclosed in this case whether any type 
of bumper device could be constructed which would have 
prevented heavily loaded cars traveling at a considerable 
rate of speed from crashing over the end of the bin. Unless 
the speed and momentum of the cars had been substantially 
checked, most any type of bumper device imaginable would 
have been ineffectual. 
Without repeating the evidence detailed in appellant's 
original brief, suffice it to say no evidence was adduced 
at the trial that in any manner suggested that the bumper 
device was insecure or in any way inadequate. Certainly, the 
distant observations of Barnes that it "seemed" as though 
the inclined bumper device broke away under the cars 
does not constitute any such evidence. As pointed out in 
appellant's original brief, the uncontradicted testimony was 
that the bumper device was supported by four 12" by 12" 
posts, by several large stringers, and the elevation of the 
rails on the bumper above the base of the track was ap-
proximately four feet (R. 135). No testimony at all was 
produced at the trial that such an engineering construction 
was improper or insecure or in any respect inadequate for 
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the purposes intended. Under the circumstances, it was 
palpable error to allow the jury to speculate and conjecture 
with respect to the subject. 
Whether either the alleged absence of a bumper device or 
the alleged hazardous construction of the bin contributed 
to the accident, is a matter about which respondent makes 
no contention and suggests no evidence which would justify 
the submission of this question to the jury. 
III. 
Appellant makes the contention in Point III of its 
brief, that the trial court gave to the jury a series of repeti-
tious, inaccurate and misleading instructions with respect 
to the Safety Appliance Act, which instructions unduly 
emphasized plaintiff's theory of the case and unbalanced 
the entire charge to the prejudice of the defendant. Re-
spondent's answer to this contention amounts to little more 
than a general denial. As illustrative of the repetitious and 
prejudicial nature of these instructions, attention is directed 
to the following : 
The single issue of an alleged violation of the Safety 
Appliance Act was submitted to the jury by five distinct 
instructions, to wit, paragraph B of Instruction No. 1, In-
struction No.2, paragraph 8 of Instruction No.4, paragraph 
9 of Instruction No. 4, and paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 
6. In addition, by paragraph 4 of Instruction No. 4, the 
pertinent provisions of the Safety Appliance Act were 
quoted at length. 
The principle that the contributory negligence of the 
deceased would constitute no defense to a violation of the 
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Safety Appliance Act by the defendant was called to the 
jury's attention by five separate instructions, to wit, para-
graph 5 of Instruction No. 4, paragraph 7 of Instruction 
No.4, paragraph 10 of Instruction No.4, Instruction No.5, 
and paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 6. 
Again, the jury were told by three different instruc-
tions either that the defendant was subject to the provisions 
of the Safety Appliance Act or that the plaintiff was en-
titled to the benefits of that Act, to wit, paragraph 6 of In-
struction No. 4, paragraph 11 of Instruction No. 4, and 
paragraph 1 of Instruction No. 6. 
In addition to their obvious vice of undue repetition 
and emphasis, several of the foregoing instructions it will 
be noted contain inaccurate and misleading statements of 
the law in the light of the definitions of Myers v. Reading 
Co., supra. Two or three of the instructions improperly 
authorize the jury to make findings of fact concerning is-
sues with respect to which there is no evidence whatever. 
IV. 
Defendant sets forth in its brief that Instructions Nos. 
7 and 8 are erroneous because they sanction a roving com-
mission to the jury to seek and find the defendant guilty 
of negligence without reference to the particular acts of 
negligence charged in the complaint or established by the 
evidence. Specifically, the complaint charged an unsafe 
method of work in allowing cars to run down the bin track 
on their own momentum with an insufficient brake, in-
stead of using an engine to control them. But paragraph 2 
of Instruction 7 permitted the jury to find the defendant 
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liable if it "failed and neglected to adopt or prescribe 
reasonable safe methods," thereby allowing the jury to 
speculate and conjecture at will on what it might consider 
to be proper means and methods to be adopted or prescribed 
by the defendant to move and spot cars, and without refer-
ence to the pleadings or evidence in the case. 
The respondent answers this by saying that in any 
event the evidence disclosed only two methods of doing the 
work and "the jury certainly could not be mislead by this 
instruction in imagining other and different ways by which 
the cars could be placed on the bin." But how is the re-
spondent qualified to guess at the limits of a jury's imagina-
tion, particularly in a case containing serious emotional 
elements such as the present one? The very fact that the 
evidence disclosed only two methods of spotting cars on the 
bin is all the more reason why the trial court should have 
strictly confined the jury's consideration to the allegations 
and the evidence. Instead, the instruction permitted the 
defendant to be found liable regardless of what unfounded 
means or methods might occur to the jury. The mere 
statement by the trial court in Instruction No. 2 that the 
burden was on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence the negligence of the defendant consisting 
of "some one or more of the acts alleged in the complaint" 
would not cure the error. It merely aggravated it. Because 
after giving Instruction No. 2, the court then threw the door 
wide open by Instruction No. 7. It is well settled that 
where evidence is conflicting, the fact that the law may be 
correctly stated in other instructions will not obviate the 
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error committed in a bad instruction. Herring v. Chicago 
& A. R. Co., 299 Ill. 214, 132 N. E. 792. 
With respect to paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 8, the 
respondent says that no roving commission was given to 
the jury by this instruction, for the reason the jury was 
not expressly advised that the plaintiff would be entitled to 
recover if an employee of the defendant were negligent. In 
plain language, however, the jury were informed that if 
Thomas sustained his injuries by reason of the negligence 
of one or more of defendant's employees, then such negli-
gence became the negligence of the defendant. In no sense 
was the negligence referred or limited to that charged in 
the complaint. It was implicit in the instruction that plain-
tiff would be entitled to reeover if any employee of the 
defendant were guilty of the general "negligence" men-
tioned. Such would be the natural interpretation of a jury, 
who would be unlikely to make the hair-splitting distinc-
tions of learned counsel for respondent. 
Apparently conceding that the trial court did commit 
prejudicial error with respect to its instructions relating 
to the issues of liability in this case, respondent makes the 
sweeping assertion that in any event no reversible error 
was committed for the reason that the evidence establishes 
the negligence of the defendant as a matter of law. But a 
cursory review of the pertinent evidence will serve to demon-
strate the complete lack of foundation for any such proposi-
tion. Presumably, the issue to which the respondent refers 
is that set forth in paragraph VIII (a) of plaintiff's 
complaint wherein it is alleged in substance: That defendant 
used an unsafe method of placing cars on the coal bin, 
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in that, instead of using a locomotive to control the speed 
of the cars, the cars were placed in motion and Thomas was 
required to station himself on the lead car and control the 
speed and momentum of said cars by a hand brake wholly 
insufficient for that purpose. 
At the outset it should be observed that the essence of 
this allegation is, again, the alleged insufficiency of the hand 
brake on the car ridden by Thomas. Since the appellant 
contends that the record is completely devoid of any evidence 
to support a claim of an insufficient hand brake and in view 
of all that heretofore has been said on this subject, it is 
difficult to understand how the respondent can assert that 
the record establishes the insufficiency of the hand brake 
as a matter of law. So far as the allegation pertains to the 
particular method used of dropping cars to the coal bin 
without the use of the engine, t~e record is replete with 
statements by all the witnesses that this was a normal and 
customary procedure. Barnes! described it as an advantag-
eous (R. 191) and convenient (R. 197) method. He testified 
that it required no unusual amount of skill for a brakeman to 
drop and spot cars on the bin (R. 188); that it was an easy 
method, if the brakeman used care to control the speed of 
the cars by means of the hand brake (R. 178, 198). When 
the suggestion was made that the bin was short of coal in 
view of the fact that the switch engine was' derailed, Barnes 
did not consider that there was anything unusual about the 
procedure of dropping the cars out to the bin. This was a 
customary method used of taking cars to the bin (R. 182-
183) . Barnes himself had dropped as many as, fifteen or 
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twenty loaded cars over the steep part of the bin track on 
prior occasions (R. 172), although he had not spotted them 
on the bin. Moreover, three or four days prior to the acci-
dent, Barnes had given Thomas. instructions concerning the 
proper procedure for riding cars on the bin track and spot-
ting them at the bin (R. 178). In these instructions, Barnes 
had pointed out how and when the speed of the cars should 
be reduced and controlled (R. 19·1). Schauster, the other 
brakeman of the crew, and both Ross and Dodds agreed that 
the method used of dropping cars to the bin was usual and 
customary, and that it was done frequently (R. 252, 297, 
313) In the teeth of such evidence, how could any court 
possibly conclude that paragraph VIII (a) of the plaintiff's 
complaint had been proved as a matter of law? 
The same is true of the respondent's statement that the 
decedent, Thomas, was not guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. There was abundant evidence that 
Thomas dropped the cars down the bin track at a dangerous 
and excessive rate of speed and that he failed to control the 
speed of the cars in accordance with the specific instructions 
given to him by Barnes only several days before (R. 178, 
191). Also, as heretofore mentioned, the evidence indicated 
that at no time did Thomas ever attempt to apply the brakes 
on the car he was riding until after he had "passed" the 
danger sign and it was too late to stop the cars on the bin. 
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the foregoing 
facts, there could not be any possible basis for application of 
the doctrine of Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 
(2d) 649, in the manner suggested by the respondent. 
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v. 
In its original brief, the appellant set forth the reasons 
why the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law 
that both the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in 
interstate commerce at the time of the accident, and that the 
plaintiff therefore was entitled to the benefits of the 
remedy afforded by the Federal Employer's Liability Act. 
The respondent does not dispute the validity of this conten-
tion, but sidesteps the entire issue on the ground that the 
defendant failed to take exception to the trial court's Instruc-
tion No.6. 
It is true that so far as disclosed by the record, defen-
dant did fail to except to Instruction No. 6. Although the 
record is silent on the matter, the reason no exception was 
taken was due to an oversight and misunderstanding be·-
tween counsel for defendent. Regardless of this, however, 
it is submitted that no exception to an instruction is neces-
sary if the error is substantial, and if it involves as does the 
error in the present case, a matter which strikes at the very 
jurisdiction of the court. It is beyond dispute that the plain-
tiff is not entitled to pursue the remedy affo.rded by the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, unless both the carriel" 
and the employer were engaged in interstate commerce at 
the time the injury or death occurred. 45 U. 8. C. A. Sec. 51. 
Here there was a failure to make a proper determination of 
this fundamental issue. Absent a correct disposition of this 
issue, the plaintiff is not properly in court on his present 
cause of action. Although the defendant's failure to except 
to the trial court's instruction ordinarily would preclude the 
defendant from urging the point on appeal, such is not the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
law if the error is manifestly one of substance, jurisdictional 
in nature. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 101, 60 P. (2d) 952, 
958; State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 493, 62 P. (2d) 1110, 
1116. Furthermore, the trial court made the same determina-
tion of this issue by necessary implication in paragraphs 
2, 3 and 5 of Instruction No. 4, to which instructions the 
defendant took separate exceptions (R. 3-58). 
Respondent in his brief states that after the stipulation 
in the record (R. 350) was entered into, "it was assumed 
by all persons connected with the trial of the case that the 
defendant had stipulated the question of interstate com-
merce and had agreed that plaintiff's remedy was properly 
pursued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act." There 
is no support in the record for any such "assumption" as 
this, and no such assumption existed in fact. The record 
indicates that both counsel for the plaintiff and the trial 
court recognized that there still was a question for the jury 
on the issue of interstate commerce, even after the stipula-
tion. The record in this. respect is perfectly plain, and is as 
follows (R. 349) : 
MR. McCARTHY: May it please the court, we 
rest our case. 
THE COURT: Do you have any witnesses, Mr. 
Black? 
MR. BLACK: No. We rest our case. 
THE COURT: I mean any rebuttal. There was 
the matter of that stipulation you mentioned last 
night. 
MR. BLACK : I think that stipulation should be 
dictated into the record in the presence of the jury. 
THE COURT: Do I understand you are pre-
pared to stipulate as Mr. Black indicated last night? 
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MR. McCARTHY: Generally, as he indicated 
last night, but only to that extent. 
MR. BAGLEY: I don't think it is a matter that 
the jury is concerned with. 
MR. BLACK: I think it is. It is an issue before 
the jury. 
MR. BAGLEY: The jury doesn't pass on stipu-
lations. 
MR. BLACK: They pass on the sufficiency of 
the evidence, if there is an issue on it. 
THE COURT: Of course, this may be an issue. 
Respondent in his brief also accuses the defendant of "a 
secret intent" to so word the stipulation that it would not 
be effective. Nothing could be further from the truth, as 
counsel for respondent well know. Since when does a de-
fendant at the trial of a closely contested case have to furn-
ish the plaintiff with vital evidence on a material issue 
joined by the pleadings? When a plaintiff offers a stipula-
tion of facts with respect to an issue, it is not the duty of 
the defendant to inform the plaintiff that the proposed 
stipulation is or is not sufficient for the purpose for which 
the plaintiff apparently intends to use it. Surely the defen-
dant was under no duty to guide the footsteps of plaintiff's 
counsel on such a question of proof, especially when the 
plaintiff was represented by experienced and able counsel. 
VI. 
Respondent disputes the defendant's contention that 
under the provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, it is entitled to offer evidence under its claim 
for set-off as set forth in the amended answer. 
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Respondent argues that annuity payments to a widow 
pursuant to the Railroad Retirement Act do not constitute 
an "insurance, relief benefit or indemnity" within the mean-
ing of these terms in Section 5. It is submitted, however, 
that the whole statutory scheme upon which such payments 
are based under the Railroad Retirement Act is one of in-
surance. Contributions to the insurance fund are made both 
by the employer and the employee during the life of the em-
ployee. Upon the death of the employee, certain insurance 
benefits derive to the employee's dependent beneficiaries in 
accordance with the extent of the contributions or payments 
previously made. If this does not constitute a plan of insur-
ance benefits, it is difficult to conceive of one. 
Respondent next objects that Section 5 allows a set-off 
only for sums, "that may have been paid to the person en-
titled thereto." Defendant's pleading seeks recovery for sums 
which the widow of the deceased "has received or is en-
titled to receive," that is, sums which already have been 
paid to or received by the widow plus the present value of 
such sums as the widow is entitled to receive. It is submitted 
that such recovery is within the literal wording and intent 
of the statute. 
The Hetrick and Peeler cases referred to in respondent's 
brief are distinguished and discussed in detail in appellant's 
original brief. 
VII. 
Appellant su}?mits that the verdict of the jury is exces-
sive and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to order a reduction in the amount or a new trial. Respon-
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dent seeks to justify the verdict by citing isolated bits of 
testimony which he interprets as support for the jury's con-
clusion. 
Appellant submits that a careful consideration of all 
the evidence fully justifies the facts and conclusions set 
forth in appellant's brief. It is submitted that the size of 
the verdict alone is sufficient to indicate prejudice and mis-
understanding of the evidence on the part of the jury, and 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in fail-
ing to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial, within 
the rule of Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. (2d) 
123. In any event, the trial court should have ordered are-
mittitur of a part of the excessive verdict, and the trial 
court's failure to do so, constitutes an abuse of discretion 
subject to review by this Court. Stephens Ranch & Live 
Stock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL and McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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